



Space Administration



# Space Exploration Medical Evacuation Risk Assessments: A Qualitative Investigation

Human Research Program  
Exploration Medical Capability Element  
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“Expanding the Boundaries of Space Medicine and Technology”

- Objective
- Background
- Approach
- Results
- Discussion
- Challenges & Limitations
- Lessons Learned

- Research Question: What unique risk assessment principles must be considered in space exploration medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) scenarios?
- Research Objectives:
  - 1: Identify common principles used to assess risks and benefits of MEDEVACs in extreme environments
  - 2: Identify common points of friction, complication, and challenges in extreme environment MEDEVACs

# Background

## Significant Incidents & Close Calls in Human Spaceflight

A product of the JSC SMA Flight Safety Office

FILTERS LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAMS HUMAN ERROR THE STORY THE TEAM ACRONYMS OTHER INTERACTIVE FSO TOOLS HELP

Loss of Crew

Crew Injury/Illness and/or Loss of Vehicle or Mission


Related/Recurring event



STS-108, 109, 110	12/5/01 - 4/8/02
STS-91	6/2/1998
Soyuz TM-9	2/11/1990
<b>SRB SEAL EVENTS 1981-96</b>	
<b>STS-51L (Challenger)</b>	<b>1/28/1986</b>
Other SRB gas seal anomalies:	
STS-2, 6, 41B, 41C, 41D, 51C, 51D, 51B, 51G, 51F, 51I, 51J, 61A, 61B, 61C, 42, 71, 70, 78	
STS-51F	7/29/1985
Soyuz 18-1 (18a)	4/5/1975
<b>POGO EVENTS 1962-70</b>	
Apollo 13	4/11/1970
Other significant pogo events:	
Apollo 4, 6, early Titan II	
Apollo 12	11/14/1969
Gemini 10	7/18/1966

Soyuz MS-10	10/11/2018
<b>ISS CARGO MISSION FAILURES 2011-2016</b>	
Progress M-12M (44P)	8/24/2011
Other ISS cargo mission failures:	
Progress M-27M & M-04, Cygnus CRS Orb-3, Dragon CRS SpX-7	

EVA INCIDENTS SUMMARY 1965-2016	
12 EVAs resulted in crew injury:	
Gemini 10, Apollo 17, Salyut 7 PE-1, Salyut 7 VE-3, STS-61-B EVAs 1&2, STS-37, Mir PE-9, STS-63, STS-97/4A, STS-100/6A EVAs 1&2, STS-134/ULF6	
Apollo 14	1/31/1971
Apollo 13	4/13/1970



Soyuz TM-5	9/6/1988
Soyuz T-11	10/2/1984
Soyuz 33	4/12/1979
Skylab 4	2/8/1974
<b>Soyuz 11</b>	<b>6/30/1971</b>

SERVICE/DESCENT MODULE SEPARATION FAILURES 1961-2008

Soyuz TMA-11 (15S)	4/9/2008
Soyuz TMA-10 (14S)	10/21/2007
Soyuz 5	1/18/1969
Voskhod 2	3/19/1965
Vostok 5	6/19/1963
Vostok 2	8/7/1961
Vostok 1	4/12/1961

TPS ENTRY EVENTS 1981-2003

STS-107 (Columbia)	2/1/2003
STS-51D	4/19/1985
STS-1	4/14/1981

Other significant STS TPS anomalies:  
STS-6, 41B, 51G, 27\*, 28, 40, 42, 45  
\* Most severe tile damage to date

STS-134	6/1/2011
STS-108	12/7/2001
<b>SOYUZ LANDING EVENTS 1967-1993</b>	
STS-97	11/30/2000
STS-90	5/3/1998

STS-37	4/11/1991
STS-51D	4/19/1985
Soyuz TM-7	4/27/1989
STS-9	12/8/1983
Soyuz T-7	12/10/1982

STS-3	3/30/1982
Soyuz 15	8/28/1974
Soyuz 23	10/16/1976
Apollo 15	8/7/1971
Apollo 12	11/24/1969

Soyuz MR-4	7/21/1969
Soyuz 18-1 (18a)	4/5/1975
Soyuz 5	1/18/1969
<b>Soyuz 1</b>	<b>4/24/1967</b>

# Background

- LEO medical care includes:
  - Crew Medical Officer (CMO) with medical kits
  - Ground based consultation
  - MEDEVAC to Definitive Medical Care Facility (DMCF) within 24-48 hours
- Missions beyond LEO face:
  - Limited/No re-supply
  - Extended communication delays
  - Extended mission durations
  - Long MEDEVAC times

*“How long should...a CMO...care for an acutely ill crewmember on orbit before calling for a MEDEVAC to a DMCF?”<sup>2</sup>*

*“It will be a weighty responsibility for a flight surgeon and flight director to determine...the need for a MEDEVAC.”<sup>2</sup>*

*“...MEDEVAC scenarios turn even more complex in a mission beyond LEO.”<sup>2</sup>*



National Aeronautics and Space Administration




# MEDEVAC Decision Space



## ARTEMIS III

Landing on the Moon in 2024

- 1 LAUNCH SLS and Orion lift off from Kennedy Space Center
- 2 JETTISON ROCKET BOOSTERS Solid rocket boosters separate
- 3 JETTISON LAUNCH ABORT SYSTEM (LAS) The LAS is no longer needed, Orion could safety abort
- 4 CORE STAGE MAIN ENGINE CUT OFF With separation
- 5 ENTER EARTH ORBIT Perform the perigee raise maneuver
- 6 EARTH ORBIT Systems check and solar panel adjustments
- 7 TRANS LUNAR INJECTION BURN Burn lasts for approximately 20 minutes
- 8 ORION OUTBOUND TRANSIT TO MOON Requires several attitude maneuvers
- 9 ORION OUTBOUND POWERED FLYBY
- 10 GATEWAY ORBIT INSERTION BURN Orion performs burn and rendezvous to dock to the Gateway
- 11 HUMAN LANDING SYSTEM (HLS) Undocks from Gateway
- 12 HLS ENTERS LOW LUNAR ORBIT Descends to lunar touchdown
- 13 GATEWAY/ORION REMAIN IN LUNAR GATEWAY ORBIT During lunar surface mission
- 14 HLS ASCENDS LOW LUNAR ORBIT Then to Gateway Orbit to dock with Gateway
- 15 CREW RETURNS TO ORION Undocks from Gateway, and departs Gateway Orbit
- 16 ORION RETURN POWERED FLYBY
- 17 ORION TRANSITS TO EARTH
- 18 ENTRY INTERFACE Enter Earth's atmosphere
- 19 SPLASHDOWN Pacific Ocean landing within view of U.S. Navy recovery ships



<sup>3</sup>Image courtesy of NASA

# Approach

- Methodology and Execution
  - In-depth semi-structured interviews
  - Qualitative *Thematic Analysis* using *Consensus, Co-occurrence and Comparison*
  - Analogs determined by mission, MEDEVAC complexity, and limited local medical capability
  - Audio anonymized, transcribed, and analyzed for emerging themes

Domain of Expertise (domain code)	
Wilderness (W)	2
Polar (P)	5
Combat (C)	4
Undersea (U)	2
Submarine (S)	3
Space (X)	4
Profession	
Physician (MD/DO)	13
Medical Provider (non-physician)	1
Military Officer	9
Flight Surgeon (NASA/Military)	5
Dive Medical Officer	1
Logistics Operations	1
Spaceflight Flight Director	1
Astronaut (NASA/ESA)	2

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# Results

- Data Collected:
  - 20 Semi-Structured SME Interviews 2020-2022
  - 22 hours of audio, 250,000+ words of transcription
- Results:
  - 18 themes
  - 2 Main Categories
    - Primary Risk Considerations
    - Contributing Factors
  - 1 Stand-Alone Theme: Decision Making

Categories	Themes
<b>Primary Risk Considerations</b>	Crew Environment Execution Experience Mission Patient(s) Provider Resources Time
<b>Contributing Factors</b>	Communication Crew Cohesion MEDEVAC Preparation Medical Support Planning Offsite Support Philosophy Political Considerations Psych Considerations
<b>Other</b>	Decision Making

- Primary Risk Considerations
  - Nine themes described by SMEs and assessed by research team to be of primary importance when making a MEDEVAC decision
  - Mostly static values or concepts
  - The “MEDEVAC math” evaluated **during the mission**

# Results

Themes	Description	Representative Statements (Alpha-numeric code denotes domain and participant number per Table I)		
<b>Crew</b>	Mission members immediately impacted by MEDEVAC, not including those injured or sick	<i>Don't create more people needing to be evacuated -W2</i>	<i>The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. -C3</i>	<i>The rest of the crew covers down for as long as they can on the taskings at hand -X4</i>
<b>Environment</b>	The natural & constructed surroundings & how they impact the crew, patients, medical care, & modes of MEDEVAC	<i>Don't poke the bear. They're not deteriorating, just let them float there with no stress and get treated -X4</i>	<i>You may not be able to help anybody...you're just trying to survive... -X4</i>	<i>About 30 minutes after they left, they hit [a mine], and we saw all of them again...the risk is just ever present -C1</i>
<b>Execution</b>	The steps, settings, & processes required to transport a patient from the POI to a DMCF	<i>[You] try not to have the level of medical care or conditions deteriorate while...evacuating -X1</i>	<i>The stresses of entry and landing...then they're hours away from care...what can we treat [in space]? -X1</i>	<i>Can you get them in a suit, strapped down...maybe? I can't provide any care...maybe talk to them, that's it -X3</i>
<b>Experience</b>	Training and exposure of medical provider(s) & crew to medical skills, MEDEVACs, & risk trade-offs	<i>Here, I've got no shortage of help. I don't have to ask the janitor to scrub in, but...that may be the case -C4</i>	<i>We were less willing to tolerate medical risks with more advanced [MEDEVAC] capabilities. -P2</i>	<i>You need real experience of doing trade-offs of sick people...and balancing impact versus patient outcome -W2</i>
<b>Mission</b>	The explicit or implied purposes for the undertaking and the things required to achieve those purposes	<i>How do you evaluate the importance...a mix of how hard it was to get there and how likely we are to come back? -W1</i>	<i>We're going to shut down most of the station to make sure this person gets on a plane to safety. -P5</i>	<i>Once you launch to Mars, you've already made that decision...the mission is more important than the people -X3</i>
<b>Patient(s)</b>	The person(s) who have become sick or injured for whom a MEDEVAC is being considered	<i>Casualty status dictates everything. -C4</i>	<i>The [first patient] was getting better...now we have two patients, do we take two? -P1</i>	<i>If it could go either way, what does the patient want to do? -P5</i>
<b>Provider</b>	The person(s) providing medical care to the patient(s) regardless of training	<i>We make recommendations, but they're going to listen. -X2</i>	<i>You've got to preserve your provider at all times... -P5</i>	<i>They're the eyes and ears on the ground, but ultimately the decision isn't for the doctor on the ground. -P5</i>
<b>Resources</b>	Local & remote workforce, consumable, & durable goods for the mission or providing medical care	<i>The crew will have to decide: do you use all your consumables on one person? -X4</i>	<i>OK, so we do this Hail Mary surgery...what do we do now? -P2</i>	<i>We'll modify the standard treatment so we don't use as many resources or people -C1</i>
<b>Time</b>	Duration of medical stability, procedures, MEDEVAC, resources, and decision space	<i>Most of the time you don't have to make a split-second decision...now you've got to talk to people -X1</i>	<i>Could I wait 24-48 hours to spin up my nominal landing site? -X1</i>	<i>If you put a [patient] in the back of an open-bed truck for a four-hour drive, they're going to die. -C1</i>

- Contributing Factors
  - Eight themes described by SMEs and assessed by research team to not be of primary importance when making a MEDEVAC decision
  - Can reduce risk and shape environment for a MEDEVAC
  - Adjusted pre-mission to influence the Primary Risk Considerations

# Results

Themes	Description	Representative Statements (Alpha-numeric code denotes domain and participant number per Table I)		
<b>Communication</b>	Transmission, receipt, and understanding of information regarding medical issues, assessments, treatments, & MEDEVAC execution	<i>It really degrades communication. It takes longer. It increases frustration. It makes everything harder.</i> -X4	<i>And I had to explain why, because these are engineers and they [don't] understand ...the medical issues</i> -X2	<i>With every handoff, there's some deterioration, and it's just like playing telephone.</i> -C1
<b>Crew Cohesion</b>	The level of camaraderie, bonding, & integration the crew has achieved before the mission begins	<i>I think crews on a deep space mission will be very, very close...they're not all good friends...like siblings.</i> -X5	<i>As a crew medical officer, that's your main goal is do the people trust you.</i> -X5	<i>We've established that trust and we were able to communicate with them.</i> -X2
<b>MEDEVAC Preparation</b>	Prior considerations, planning & rehearsals for MEDEVACs through both training and mission/vehicle design	<i>You won't get more training hours.</i> -X4	<i>[MEDEVAC] is not a pickup game.</i> -C3	<i>That's why we train for the things that we do...hoping that the scenario we meet on the real day is not nearly as tough...</i> -X1
<b>Medical Support Preparation</b>	Prior consideration, planning & rehearsals for medical scenarios through both training and mission/vehicle design	<i>I will tell you the medical team, the hours we get for medical training are few and far between.</i> -X4	<i>It's about \$6k a year to support...We just made the call like we're not going to do it.</i> -W2	<i>Common things happen commonly...you have to think about high consequence, low incidence...as well</i> -W2
<b>Offsite Support</b>	The availability for remote resources, consultation, & guidance to be provided to the crew	<i>Whoever the lead surgeon is in Houston, it's that chief physician who makes the recommendation.</i> -X2	<i>...my team has been activated and they are available to provide full support...</i> -P3	<i>...if you're having a bad day... talk to your buddy...call your wife...if you're calling NASA...there's something weird</i> -X5
<b>Philosophy</b>	The underlying culture, approach, and acceptability for risk, casualties, and MEDEVAC planning	<i>...we're smart enough to figure it out</i> -X4	<i>Prepare them to be autonomous or just ask them to be careful and accept that they might die.</i> -X5	<i>...it all goes back to that priority scheme of crew safety, vehicle safety, mission.</i> -X1
<b>Political Considerations</b>	Broad organizational, national, and international impacts from the success or failure of a mission, crew injury, or loss of life	<i>...paratroopers die in a helicopter crash...and we almost shrug...we don't think like that for astronauts...</i> -X5	<i>...we don't want any narcotics because of the risk of diversion...that seems very shortsighted...</i> -W2	<i>...if an astronaut dies, it's bad for the astronaut...and national prestige...that drives the resources put into saving someone</i> -X5
<b>Psychological Considerations</b>	The mental health support, training, and assets provided in case of injury or the death of a crewmember	<i>...human spaceflight has to be the strongest link of the operation...resiliency, even for the most dedicated</i> -W2	<i>When you put people in those amounts of pressure...it's impossible to predict...the ones who are going to fold up.</i> -P5	<i>...being in the same camp where now there's people missing from seats, that's a different experience.</i> -C2

# Results

- Decision Making
  - **How** MEDEVAC decisions are made, by **whom**, at **what level** of an organization, and with **what information**
  - Impacts both **during the mission and pre-mission**

Theme	Description	Representative Statements		
Decision Making	How a MEDEVAC decision is made, by whom, at what level, & with what information	<i>Make your recommendations, but it's up to the commander</i> -C1	<i>You never tell the pilot it's a 3-year-old who's going to die if you don't go out</i> -P2	<i>You need roles, responsibilities, &amp; decisions made at the right places...the lowest possible level</i> - X2



# Mission CONOP MEDEVAC Risk Analysis

National Aeronautics and Space Administration



## MEDEVAC Risk Analysis


Artemis III Mission Phase 12/13: Lunar EVA Ops

MEDEVAC Concept: Lunar Surface -> Gateway

Medical Incident Level: II

Overall Score: High (Resources)


Category	Score
Crew	+
Environment	+
Execution	0
Experience	0
Mission	++
Patient(s)	+
Provider	0
Resources	+++
Time	++




<sup>3</sup>Image courtesy of NASA

# Discussion

## Inter-Category Connections



# Contributing Factors Intra-Category Connections



# Challenges & Limitations

- Challenges
  - Operational constraints on several SME Interviews
  - Several conflicting or opposing opinions
- Limitations
  - Qualitative nature of data and analysis
  - Research team familiar with MEDEVACs and spaceflight


- Lessons Learned
  - MEDEVAC decision space is broad and complicated
  - Exploration vs LEO missions bring new aspects into consideration (e.g. mission, politics, psych, philosophy)
- Forward Work
  - Work submitted for publication
  - NASA Earth Independent Medical Operations Working Group
  - Define objective criteria within risk categories/themes
  - Pair with IMPACT tool to ID phases with high-probability for medical event/MEDEVAC for risk assessments

# References

1. Packham, N., & Ali, F. (2020). Significant incidents & close calls in human spaceflight. NASA JSC S&MA Flight Safety Office, JS-2015-004 NNJ13RA01B.
2. Johnston, S. L., Smart, K. T., & Patarini, J. M. (2019). Medical Evacuation Risk and Crew Transport. In Principles of Clinical Medicine for Space Flight (pp. 327–353). Springer.
3. Artemis III: NASA's First Human Mission to the Lunar South Pole | NASA. (n.d.). Retrieved January 17, 2023, from <https://www.nasa.gov/feature/artemis-iii>



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# Questions?

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